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  How should the size and number of cities evolve optimally as population grows? Stripped of the 
constraints of geography itself, the setup of the New Economic Geography implies that de-agglomeration 
(or de-urbanization) is efficient. The number of cities increases while the size of each decreases on the 
optimal path until the economy suddenly disperses to tiny towns of stand-alone firms each specializing in a 
unique good. The cause of this narrow result is the NEG’s strong emphasis on intercity trade to satisfy the 
taste for more goods. For the same aggregate population, a system of smaller cities saves time lost in 
commuting, has a larger labor supply and makes more goods than does a system of larger cities. Falling 
interurban trading costs favor this de-urbanization process. Only if intraurban commuting costs fall 
sufficiently, can a pattern of growing city sizes be efficient with growing population. Of course, when the 
number of cities or the geographic space itself is limited or asymmetric, then agglomeration can arise as an 
artifact of the constraints imposed by geography as demonstrated by numerous NEG models. This reveals 
that the central agglomerative force in the NEG is space itself and not the underlying economic relations. 
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1. Introduction 
      The birth of the New Economic Geography (NEG) can be traced to Krugman (1980) 
who started adopting this unique set of functional forms soon after the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model made its debut in 1977. Since then, and especially in recent years, a rich variety of 
complex extensions of the basic model have been developed and studied. For some of the 
most recent contributions, see Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999) and Fujita, Krugman, 
Venables (1999). But although this young field has zoomed ahead in recent years, we still 
do not have a clear grip on many consequences of the underlying economic toolbox 
employed in the NEG model. Clarity has been difficult to achieve because, in all previous 
applications, the fundamental economic forces that are operative in the model – the so 
called centripetal and centrifugal forces – are obscured and confounded by the emphasis 
on the asymmetries and spatial limitations that are inherent in the specific geographies 
that are studied.  
            Take a very basic and important question: what does the NEG imply about the 
efficiency of urbanization?  A variant of the NEG model developed here will allow us to 
investigate this issue by seeing how city sizes and the number of cities should evolve 
under population growth, falling interurban trading cost and falling intra-urban 
                                                 
1 The paper was presented at MacMaster University on September 21,  2002 at a conference honoring Yorgos 
Papageorgiou. I  thank David Pines and Takatoshi Tabuchi for their comments and discussions on several points. 
Useful comments were also received from three anonymous referees of this journal and from the editor.   3 
commuting cost. Within the NEG tradition, this question would be investigated by 
working out the model over a specific geographic space (much as is done in Fujita, 
Krugman, Mori (1999)). It turns out, however, that stripping away the geography – as we  
do in this paper – is insightful from a theoretical standpoint because it reveals the true 
nature of the underlying economic forces inherent in the NEG. Our findings imply that 
the constraints of specific geographies act as a centripetal force that is the cause of spatial 
agglomeration. Once these constraints are removed, the economics inherent in the NEG 
toolbox imply that agglomeration is ultimately inefficient under population growth: the 
centrifugal forces swamp the centripetal ones and cities vanish. This is an undesirable 
result in the sense that a theory of agglomeration should be able to generate 
agglomeration even in the absence of geography.    
       It  is  important  to  note  at  the  outset that the NEG has three drawbacks that are 
increasingly recognized. First, it totally neglects normative issues. Second, the basic 
NEG setup exaggerates the importance of trade among cities by assuming that all goods 
are unique and that variety-hungry consumers desire all of the goods in the economy. 
Third, as pointed out by Pines (2001) the NEG explains the presence of urban 
agglomerations in an anachronistic manner, by relying – to a very large degree – on the 
trade between urban and agricultural areas, neglecting internal urban structure and land 
markets.
2  
      In this paper, we will remove agriculture from the commonly used NEG setup and we 
will synthesize this modernized version with a model of a system of identical cities with 
land markets common in urban economics (Henderson (1988)). Using such a hybrid 
                                                 
2 Actually, in his early papers, Krugman (1980, 1991) ignored agriculture but his cities without land markets were 
confined to a two-point limited geography. There are some recent extensions that have introduced urban land markets 
into Krugman’s 1991 model. See, for example, Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996) which also deals with a two-
point limited geography.     4 
model, we will examine how the size and number of cities − in a system of identically 
sized cities − should evolve over time to maintain maximum welfare in an economy 
continually growing in aggregate population. To this end, we make two key assumptions  
about the number of cities and their spatial arrangement. 
      1) The number of cities is endogenous. This assumption is central to all traditional 
systems-of-cities models in urban economics (e.g. Henderson and Ioannides (1981)). In 
contrast, the NEG has emphasized models with a fixed number of sites where cities can 
emerge.   
       2) The spatial arrangement of cities is symmetric  (illustrated in Figure 1). Imagine 
that there is a circle of arbitrarily large radius with a long enough perimeter to contain on 
it as large a number of cities as we might be interested in. Suppose also that each city is 
connected to the circle’s center by a spoke, representing a transport route.  Goods traded 
between cities move from the originating city through the corresponding spoke to the 
center of the circle and then through another spoke to the city of destination. The distance 
from any city to any other is the same. This symmetric geography is explicit or implicit in 
virtually all of the systems-of-cities models of urban economics. In the models of 
Henderson (1988), trading costs among cities are assumed zero and, hence, the same 
symmetric geography of Figure 1 holds implicitly. In models with positive trading costs 
between cities (e.g. Abdel-Rahman (1996) or Anas and Kai (2002)) the symmetric 
geography of Figure 1 is imposed explicitly.  
      It is necessary to use such symmetry in order to strip the basic NEG setup from the 
effects of specific (asymmetric) geographies. Without the confounding effect of a specific 
geography we are able to expose the economic forces of the NEG centered on iceberg 
trading cost, the taste for variety and constant markup and see whether these are   5 
inherently centripetal or centrifugal. If the NEG setup on the symmetric geography 
creates no agglomeration (a result we will establish in this paper) then the agglomeration 
that occurs in the NEG setup must be caused by the geographical constraints assumed and 
not by the economic relationships.  This should turn our attention to finding economic 
forces that create agglomeration when geographic constraints are absent.  Subsequently, 
by imposing the geography one could see what difference the geography itself makes. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
      Where t denotes time, let P(t) denote the aggregate exogenous population, n(t) the 
endogenous optimal number of cities and N(t) the endogenous optimal city size. Then, 
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Table 1 shows the three patterns that are consistent with   In the first of these 
patterns which I call balanced agglomeration the number of cities does not decrease over 
time as each city gets bigger or maintains its size. In the second pattern which I call 
concentrated agglomeration, cities get bigger but fewer with the possibility that there  
. 0 ) ( > t P &
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
would be one huge city at the limit. In the third pattern which I call de-agglomeration or 
de-urbanization, cities get smaller and more numerous with the possibility that there will 
be infinitesimally small or minimally sized cities at the limit. It is important to make a 
distinction between de-agglomeration and dispersion. Dispersion means that economic 
activity spreads out over geographic space as new agglomerations are created. This 
process can reduce the size of some agglomerations without totally destroying them. By   6 
de-agglomeration I am referring not only to spreading out but to the total decline of the 
agglomeration so that each settlement is minimally sized and completely specialized.   
       Which pattern of Table 1 is optimal will depend on the specification of a particular 
theoretical model. A model that generates all three urbanization patterns under different 
parameter values is better than a model that generates only some. Arguably, the best 
model should generate each pattern under alternative parameter values. A model that is 
locked into any one or two of these patterns may be regarded as limited in scope or 
suspect and we would need to understand why it produces such a limited set of results. 
We will show that the NEG model is locked into the de-agglomeration pattern, when 
population increases while other factors are constant and we will see why. 
        The  three  patterns  can  be  explained as a tug of war between economic forces 
causing urbanization and those causing dispersal.  For example, growth accommodated in 
existing cities causes location costs (rent plus transport costs) to rise creating an impetus 
for smaller and, hence, more cities to keep these costs from increasing too much. Hence, 
intra-city location costs are a centrifugal economic force inducing dispersal of economic 
activity to smaller cities. If the consumer desires all of the goods in the economy 
(extreme taste for variety), then if cities are smaller fewer goods are produced locally and 
more must be imported. The incentive to avoid importation costs acts as a centripetal 
force favoring fewer and larger cities. If this force is strong, there could be just one city at 
the limit. In that case, since all the goods are locally produced there is no trading cost. 
But, there is a third force that is centrifugal. If cities are smaller, less time is wasted in 
commuting and more is available for production. This means that the variety of goods in 
the city system is larger if cities are smaller. A central planner who is maximizing 
consumer welfare must balance the three forces at the margin.    7 
        We  will  show  that  under  the  special functional forms of the NEG, the welfare 
maximizing economy with growing population is on a trajectory of increasing numbers of 
cities and decreasing city sizes (de-agglomeration), suddenly collapsing to single-factory 
towns when aggregate population exceeds a threshold level. Hence, with population 
growth and without the constraining effects of geography, the NEG implies that there 
should be no cities eventually. To the extent that NEG models produce agglomeration, 
the limitations imposed by geography act as a centripetal force in the NEG models, 
obscuring the workings of the three forces identified in the previous paragraph.  
       Why should the two centrifugal forces always end up prevailing over the centripetal 
force in models of the NEG? The key reason for this are the variety-hungry consumers of  
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977). Such consumers desire all of the goods in the economy and are 
always hungry for more goods. Population growth makes markets larger and causes more 
goods to emerge. But the number of goods is largest when they are produced in the 
smallest cities because that saves time lost in commuting, making more labor available to 
production. And this centrifugal force is even stronger when interurban trading costs are 
low.  
       This last property is the opposite of that in Krugman’s core-periphery model without 
land markets. In that model, trade being between urban areas and agricultural areas, a fall 
in trading cost would make it optimal to allocate urban producers to one region making a 
larger market for goods there while cheaply serving farmers in the periphery.
3 Hence, in 
that model, a fall in trading cost increases the efficiency of concentration. In our model a 
fall in trading cost makes it optimal to disperse producers into smaller cities, saving intra-
                                                 
3 For the core-periphery model of the NEG, see chapter 5 in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).  
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city commuting and increasing labor supply which in turn increases the varieties   
available for consumption.   
       The de-agglomeration property of the NEG applied to a system of cities clashes with 
basic observations about the history of urbanization in the world economy. Although a 
model of identical city sizes does not apply exactly to the real world, the number of cities 
and the average size of cities have greatly increased over the centuries. In particular, the 
increase in the number of very large cities has become a dominant phenomenon in the 
last one hundred years or so. A prediction that the historical pattern of increasing 
urbanization is grossly inefficient cannot be taken seriously. So there are two possible 
responses to this finding. One response is to continue to defend the NEG model by 
observing that population growth is not the only exogenous factor and that interurban and 
intra-urban transport (and communication) costs have been falling due to technical 
progress such as motorized transportation, railroads, telephone, the Internet. To argue the 
efficiency of increasing agglomeration trends, one would have to argue that the historical 
fall in intra-urban personal transport costs has been so great as to offset the parallel and 
also great fall in interurban freight transportation and communication costs plus the 
dispersive effect of population growth. Another response is a rejection of the NEG model 
because it overemphasizes the importance of trade among cities while ignoring 
efficiencies from search costs or the formation of human capital in cities (Black and 
Henderson (1999)) as well as other centripetal forces causing city growth. 
            The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a simple model of a 
single city in the tradition of urban economics. Then, in section 3 we set up a system of 
such identical cities each producing differentiated products. The cities are linked with 
trade among them via the special Dixit-Stiglitz setup of the NEG. Consumers in each city   9 
import all of the differentiated goods produced in the rest of the economy. In section 4, 
we examine how this city system should evolve when its aggregate population grows 
exogenously and when interurban trading costs or intra-urban commuting costs fall. We 
prove the basic de-agglomerative property. Section 5 discusses some numerical 
examples, showing that large numbers of cities before dispersal are optimal only when 
the taste for variety is extremely low. Section 6 concludes by assessing the alternative 
explanations for efficient agglomeration. 
2.   Internal structure of the representative city 
      We assume monocentric and circular cities. All production occurs at a central point 
(the Central Business District, or CBD). Producers do not use land. The only input is the 
labor supplied by the consumers living in the city. Each consumer uses one unit of land 
(fixed lot size) and is endowed by a unit amount of time that he allocates between labor 
and commuting to the CBD. The time-cost of commuting a unit distance in both 
directions (round trip) is s, an exogenous constant. If a consumer picks his residence 
location to be r miles from the CBD, then his labor supply is  . We will use 
N to denote the number of consumer/laborers residing in the city and 
sr r H − =1 ) (
r  to denote the 
radius of the city. Then, since lot sizes are uniformly equal to one,  .
π
N
= r  The 
maximum possible radius for a city is 
s
1
, since a consumer residing beyond that radius 
would spend all of his time commuting and would have no time to work. The maximum 
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labor, H, supplied to the CBD is              10 
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k ≡ .  Since k is a normalization of s, we can use either k or s to measure unit 
commuting cost. 
       The principle that determines city structure under the assumption of zero relocation 
costs is that identical residents achieve the same level of utility no matter where within 
the city they locate. Indirect utility is of the form V(p, I), where p is the price vector of 
the goods in the economy for the residents of the city and I is the disposable income of 
any resident that is available to buy those goods. For the value of utility to be invariant 
with location within the city, the disposable income must be the same for each resident. 
Disposable income is defined as income less location costs (commuting costs plus the 
rent of the unit sized lot). Hence, location costs must be invariant with residence location. 
We assume that rent at the edge of the city is zero, because there is no non-urban use for 
it. We assume also that time spent commuting is valued at the wage rate, w. Then, 
commuting cost (to the CBD and back) as a function of residential distance is 
. Hence, the rent on land at radius  wsr r CC = ) ( r r ≤ ≤ 0 i s   w r r s r R ) ( ) ( − = . The 
location cost of any one resident is then  
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wsN
r ws wsr r R N LC = = + = ,                                (3)  
independent of r. We will assume that a local city government collects all rents and 
redistributes the average rent to each city resident. The total rent thus shared is  
                                          ∫ = =
r wsN
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Note that both 
N
TR
 and LC are increasing functions of the city’s population, N. However, 
LC rises three times faster than 
N
TR
. The disposable income of any consumer can now be 
calculated as 
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N
N TR
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Note that as N grows the disposable income falls because the marginal (and average) 
resident spends more time commuting in a larger city. The consumer has this income to 
purchase all the goods that will be offered in the city system.  We now turn to how cities 
are linked through trade of the NEG type. 
3. A system of cities based on the NEG 
     We will consider only the case of symmetric monocentric cities, each organized 
internally according to the description of the previous section. Suppose that there are n 
such cities. Let each city produce m  unique goods in its CBD, each produced by a 
different firm.
4 Although n and m should each be integer, to simplify the analysis we will 
treat both as continuous and differentiable variables: 1  The lower limit helps 
fix the notion that there must be at least one city and at least one good in the economy. 
. , ∞ < ≤ n m
      Let  be the quantity of good j produced in city i and consumed by a consumer in 
any representative city. Let the utility function of such a consumer be Dixit-Stiglitz 
C.E.S. (1977): 
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U                                               (6) 
                                                 
4 Whether these goods are variants (brands) in the same industry or belong to different industries is immaterial.    12 
where   is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods and l , lot size, is set 
to one by assumption, as was explained in section 2. U exhibits an extreme taste for 
variety: as the quantity of a good approaches zero, its marginal utility shoots out to 
infinity. Thus, a consumer prefers to consume an infinitesimal quantity of any available 
good (even if its price is extremely high) than do without it. This strong taste for variety 
disappears as σ → ∞. As that extreme is approached, the goods begin to look like perfect 
substitutes (linear indifference curves) and variety no longer matters to the consumer: he 
would always consume only the cheapest good.  
1 > σ
     In symmetric equilibrium, we will use q to denote the mill price of any good. As in the 
NEG, intra-urban transport costs for goods are assumed to be zero. Hence, locally 
produced goods can be consumed without incurring any transport costs. Interurban 
transport costs for goods are assumed paid by the consumers and will be of the iceberg 
type with  , the fraction of the good shipped from the origin city’s CBD that 
arrives at the destination city’s CBD, to be purchased there by a consumer. Then, 
corresponds to the case of zero transport costs while   is the case of infinitely 
high transport costs under which trade will be prohibitively costly. Suppose, for example, 
that  . Then, that means that each consumer must order twice the demanded 
quantity because half of the quantity will melt in transport. With these assumptions, the 
effective unit price of a quantity imported from another city will be 








> q while the unit 
price of a good produced in one’s own city will be q. Because of the symmetry we 
assumed in the spatial arrangement of cities (Figure 1), a consumer located in city i will 
want to consume   units of each good produced in city i and   units of each good  i x i x−  13 
produced in any other city. Then, the utility of a representative resident in city i can be 
rewritten as follows by imposing the symmetry on (6): 
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The budget constraint is:  ) ( ) 1 ( N I
q
mx n q mx i i = − + − τ
, where w kN N I ) 1 ( ) ( 2
1
− = , from 
section 2, is the disposable income of a consumer after payment of location costs. From 
(6′), the indirect utility function of any consumer in the city system under symmetry is: 


























V .                                (7) 
      To determine the number of product varieties, m, we will employ the assumption of 
the NEG models that each product is manufactured using labor only: a fixed quantity of 
labor, f, is required for production to start and each unit produced requires a marginal 
quantity, c. The manufacturers are monopolistically competitive. So, the ensuing 
equilibrium is that of Chamberlin (1933). As is well-known, the profit maximizing price 
of each differentiated product is set to satisfy a markup over marginal cost and each 
producer makes zero profit because of unrestricted entry by manufacturers. The markup 
condition is  wc
E
q = − )
1
1 ( where E is the price elasticity of the consumers’ demand for 
any good. With the utility function (1), this price elasticity − as is well known −is 







 where w is the wage and wc the marginal cost.
5 Using this in the zero profit 
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. Now to 
determine how many varieties a city will produce, we need to look at the labor market 
clearing condition for a city. We saw in equation (2) that the labor supplied by a city of N 
consumers is H= ) 1 ( 2
1
kN N −
) ( s cz f m +
. The aggregate labor demanded by the city’s  m producers, 
meanwhile, is   and using the  derived above, this is  . Setting the labor 
demand and supply to be equal and solving, 








6    
          Earlier, we restricted the number of goods to be produced by a city to be 1 or larger. It is 
useful to derive the size of a minimal city (a single factory town) producing only one good. Call 
this size  . Since the labor required to produce a single good is  , the labor market in a 
minimally sized city clears by 
min N σ f
) 1 ( 2
1
min min min kN N H − ≡
σ f
= . The unique solution is of the form 
=) , with F increasing in and increasing in k. (As k, unit commuting cost, increases 
less labor is supplied by each resident on average. To meet the aggregate labor supply, fσ, more 
residents must be added to the factory town. More precisely,  
σ f
min N , ( k fσ F
. 0








dNmin =  The 
denominator is positive since  ) We have thus established a range for city 
sizes ( . The maximal city size 
. 9 / 4
2
min k N ≡ < max N








max N  is limited only by k, as we saw 
                                                 
5 Note that the markup is independent of the number of firms sharing the market, a direct consequence of the 
approximation that E ≈ σ. This is a standard property of all NEG models.   
6 Because of symmetry, there are effectively two markets: the labor market and the market for products. Walras’s Law 
implies that if the labor market clears (as shown earlier) the product markets must clear as well.     15 
in section 2, while the minimal city size, as we just saw, is limited by f, the economies of scale 
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= m  and  N I 1 ( ) ( − =  into the indirect utility function  
 (7) and set the wage rate w as the numeraire price, w = 1. After some simple algebra, the  
 indirect utility (7) becomes: 
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N n V  .                             (7′) 
This expression serves as the measure of welfare to be maximized by the central planner with 
respect to n and N, taking P=nN as a constraint with P given. We have assumed that the 
planner treats equals equally by keeping consumers in different cities at the same level of 
utility. The planner also takes as given the land market equilibrium within each city and takes 
as given the markup of each producer. 
4. The optimal pattern of cities 
     We will examine two types of optima. In the first, the local planner of a city  
determines the population of a city so as to parochially maximize (7′) the utility level of the 
representative resident of that city. In doing so, the local government does not consider that it 
might alter the population available to other cities. This assumption is plausible if, in fact, 
there are so many cities that each city accommodates only a small part of the aggregate 
population. Solving this problem determines what I will call the autarkic-efficient size of a 
city. This will act as a benchmark in the analysis to follow. To get this size, maximize V given 
























= =  is the maximum 
population that can be accommodated in a city as derived in section 2. The autarkic-efficient 
city size,   depends only on σ and k (or s). Note also that it is a fraction of the maximum 
city size. Such an autarkic-efficient city size with m  > 1 exists as long as 
, easily guaranteed by the choice of a sufficiently low f, the fixed labor 
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What fraction of maximum size is the autarkic-efficient size? Suppose that σ = 10 (ω =  
0.11), then the autarkic efficient size is about 6.2% of the maximum size. If σ = 5 (ω = 0.25), 
then the autarkic size is about 18.37% of the maximum. If σ = 2 (ω = 1), then the autarkic size 
is 56.25% of the maximum size. As these examples show, autarkic-efficient size decreases as 
σ increases. A higher σ means that goods variety is valued less by the consumer (the goods 
are more like perfect substitutes). Hence, cities can afford maximum utility at smaller sizes 
saving on commutation time but offering fewer local goods.   
In the second type of optimum that is of direct interest to us in this paper, we assume the  
presence of a central planner who takes the aggregate population as given and determines the 
number of cities so that the utility of the representative consumer is maximized. To get the 
appropriate objective function, we must recognize that given aggregate population, P, the 
number of cities and the size of a city are related by n =  .
N
P
 Plugging this into (7′), dropping 
the leading constant, and making some simplifications we get: 
           
1 2
1 1 1
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V N P V .                             (7′′)   17 
To determine the optimal city size and, at the same time, the number of such optimally 
sized cities, the planner will maximize (7′′) with respect to N in  and we 
assume that   is sufficiently large so that there will be at least several (or many) cities at 
the optimum. The result is a socially optimal first-best partition of the population into n 
cities. The allocation is first-best, despite the fact that the planner is taking the 
monopolistic markup as given. This is so because, in contrast to Dixit-Stiglitz (1977), 
there is no other good toward which the allocation can be distorted as a result of the 
markup. As derived earlier, the amount of labor is H=




1 ( kN N − , and the number of 




) 1 ( 2
1
−
=  and both are independent of the markup. 
Proposition 1 (De-agglomeration with population growth): Assume that σ ≥ 2 and 
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aggregate population, P, starts at some initial value P
1 0 < <τ
0 and grows continuously and 
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Then, at some P = , when cities are of size  , city sizes will suddenly drop to  P P
~ ˆ < N ˆ
N min, remaining there for all larger P. 
             
Proof: See Appendix. Refer to Figure 2 for an illustration of the claim of the Proposition. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
            While the Appendix proves the claimed result for (7′), derived from the  
        functional forms of  the NEG (C.E.S./iceberg/constant markup ), the result  holds more  
        generally for any reduced form indirect utility function in which the effects of n and N are    18 
        separable. Thus letV  where  ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 N V n V N n = N P n = . Differentiating this with respect to  
        N we get 
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reflecting that utility  
        must increase with n since that would increase the number of varieties. But, since P is   







Therefore, the  
        first term in (8) measures the negative marginal effect on utility from increasing city size,  
        thus reducing aggregate variety. The second term is the marginal effect on city size keeping n  
        constant. As we saw earlier, V is inverse U-shaped increasing as N rises toward the   ) ( 2 N
         autarkically efficient size  and decreasing for N > . Since, 
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Hence, the socially optimal city size must be smaller than  as claimed in  
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and in that case the socially optimal city size is  . 
* N
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
      Figure 3 shows the path of city sizes as a function of aggregate population. It also 
includes the cases of infinite ( ) and zero (  trading costs. In the former case, 
trade is prohibitively costly. Hence, for all P, cities do not trade and welfare is maximized 
by autarkic-efficient city sizes. As aggregate population grows, the optimal economy 
0 = τ ) 1 = τ  19 
creates more and more autarkically-sized self sufficient cities. This is an example of a 
balanced agglomeration path on which identical cities are replicated ad-infinitum, a 
property of city systems without trade between cities (as in Henderson and Ioannides 
(1981)). With zero trading costs, more than minimal cities are not ever optimal because 
any larger concentration creates unnecessary location costs.  
       Proposition 1 means that the special model of the NEG when synthesized with a 
model of city size, always produces de-agglomeration and complete dispersal of 
economic activity when population grows sufficiently large. The alternative patterns of 
balanced or concentrated agglomeration (identified in Table 1) do not happen. Why does 
the NEG model produce such a narrow result? To gain more insight into that question, we 
will rewrite the utility function (7) as follows: 
) ( ) ( ) , (
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1 1 N I
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= − ≡  are the 
locally available varieties  (previously derived in section 3) and the varieties imported 
from other cities, respectively. Taking logs of (9a): 
           [] ) ( ln ) , ( ) ( ln
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.                          (9b) 
This last equation directly shows how city size affects welfare through three effects. The 
first of these is the local variety (or home market) effect measured by m(N). Note that as 
N increases, the number of local varieties increases because the derivative of m(N) with   20 
respect to N is always nonnegative in the range  . This effect means that 
adding more people to a city increases the labor supply and the local demand for 
varieties.  This causes new varieties to be supplied locally because the local market gets 
bigger. The second effect is the imported varieties effect, measured by  . 
Note that this effect does not exist when τ = 0 (infinite trading cost), since nothing is 
imported in that case. Note also that in the case of τ = 1 (zero trading cost), there is no 
difference between local and imported varieties since the latter can be imported at zero 
cost. In that case, the two effects in (9b) add up to the total number of varieties 
. Finally, note that as σ → ∞ the combined variety effects have no 
weight because consumers view all goods as perfect substitutes. 
max min N N N < ≤
) , (
1 N P M
− σ τ
) , ( ) ( N P M N m +
       The imported varieties effect is a negative one for city size: making cities bigger 
while keeping P constant (i.e. reducing the number of cities) reduces the number of 
imported varieties. The reason is that as cities get bigger average location costs in cities 
go up and less time is left for production. Hence, as P increases, the aggregate labor 
supply increases less than it would if there were more and smaller cities with lower 
commuting costs. This property favors dispersal as P increases because with dispersal 
there would be more labor supply and more imported goods. To see this directly, note 
that  . 0











Finally, the third effect is the location cost effect, 
measured by  ) 1 ( ) ( 2
1
kN N I − = . This effect means that when cities get larger disposable 
income decreases because, as we saw in section 2, commuting and rent costs build up 
with city size. This effect also favors dispersal. How city size and the model’s parameters 
affect each effect is shown in Table 2.   21 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
      Since the optimal city size decreases with increasing population, P, it must be true 
that the local variety effect that favors larger cities is offset by the imported variety and 
location cost effects that individually favor smaller cities.  
       The next two propositions are proved in a way similar to Proposition 1 and show 
how de-agglomeration happens when the unit iceberg trading cost falls or unit commute 
cost rises through their corresponding threshold values.  
Proposition 2:  (De-agglomeration with declining trading cost): Assume that σ ≥ 2 and 
















k =  and P, suppose that τ starts 
at some initial value τ0 and increases continuously and monotonically toward  . 

























2) 3 + (
≡ , when cities are of 
size  > N ˆ *
4
1
N , city sizes will suddenly drop to N min, remaining there for larger τ.             
 
Proof:  It follows that of Proposition 1. g 
 
       Why does falling trading cost encourage decentralization and dispersal? Recall our 
discussion of the three effects after Proposition 1. From Table 2, a lowering of trading 
costs strengthens the imported varieties effect while it has no direct effect on the local 
varieties  and  location costs effects. This favors smaller cities because for the same 
aggregate population a system of smaller cities affords a larger labor supply and can 
make more varieties than can a system of larger cities. Note that this result is the opposite 
of that in Krugman’s core-periphery model. Although his analysis in that model is 
equilibrium rather than optimum analysis, the basic insight is that lower interurban   22 
trading costs make it cheaper for agricultural consumers in the periphery to import goods 
from the urban core. At the optimum, locating all manufacturers in the core would 
capture home market efficiencies. Because Krugman’s core-periphery model in its 
standard version does not include location costs (cities are points without land) there is 
nothing to offset the home market efficiency gains. By contrast, in our setting, if firms 
were to concentrate in cities in response to lower interurban trading costs, location costs 
would go up and the aggregate variety of goods in the city system would fall because 
more time would be wasted commuting.    
Proposition 3:  (De-agglomeration with increasing commuting cost): Assume a small 
enough f and small enough k, so that N min=) ,  is very close to zero and very far 
from 








= ω ,  , and P, suppose 
that k starts at some initial value of commuting cost k
1 0 < <τ
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N . Then, at some k 
=k  when cities are of  size  > k
~ ˆ < N ˆ * N
4
1
, city sizes will suddenly drop to 
N min=) , and will eventually settle there for all larger k.           ˆ , ( k fσ F
    
Proof:   The procedure follows that of Proposition 1. In this case, the path of the 
optimization being monotonic cannot be guaranteed by requiring  g  . 2 ≥ σ
       Obviously, increasing unit commuting cost strengthens the location cost effect which 
is negative for larger city size. But a higher k indirectly also weakens the variety effects 
because more time is used to commute and less is left to produce. This favors dispersal   23 
into smaller cities so that commuting time can be saved and the number of varieties 
increased. It should be noted that if k = 0 and τ < 1 maximal city size is infinite and there 
is only one city containing all population, since that is the largest home market that can 
be formed and no commuting cost is incurred. If k > 0 and τ = 1, cities are minimally 
sized because that maximizes the number of varieties. Finally, when k = 0 and τ = 1, city 
sizes are indeterminate. 
5. Numerical examples 
     It is worthwhile to work out a few numerical examples. The question we want to pose 
is related to Proposition 1. We have shown that the taste for variety that causes intensive 
trading of goods among cities is responsible for the result that maintaining cities 
(urbanization) becomes inefficient when aggregate population is high. Turning this 
observation around, we can ask: Just how low should the taste for variety be for cities to 
persist at large aggregate population? Maximum city size depends only on unit 
commuting cost and serves as a benchmark. Suppose that maximum city size is 100 
million workers. Interurban transport costs in reality are not very high. Let us assume that 
 which means that about 11% more should be shipped than is desired for 
consumption. We calculate   and   for various values of  , the elasticity of 
substitution among varieties. As noted earlier, the higher the value of   is the closer the 
goods are to perfect substitutes and, hence, the lower is the importance of variety. A high 
delays the population level at which cities should disappear to maintain efficiency. 
Consider the results for  , 50 and 100. These values are way out of the range of the 
 values employed in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), but as we shall see at the 
low  values that they employ, the taste for variety is so strong that an economy of cities 









= σ  24 
falls apart even at very low levels of aggregate population. Even when  =20, autarkic-
optimal city size is only 2.4 million workers and   = 4.29 million. Recall that cities 
should break up when they are smaller than autarkic-efficient but larger than one-quarter 
the size of autarkic efficient. This means that at the critical point when the economy of 
cities suddenly disintegrates into stand-alone factory towns there will be no more than 
about 7 cities in existence, each with about 600,000 workers. To get more cities just 
before the critical point is reached we have to go to higher values of  . When  = 50, 
autarkic-optimal city size is 320,000  workers and    = 14.45 million so there are no 
more than 180 cities just before they fall apart into single-firm factory towns. And when 
= 100, autarkic-optimal city size is about 92,000 workers and    = 747,650,000.  That 
gives an upper bound of about 32,500 pretty small cities just before complete de-
urbanization becomes optimal. The lower the taste for variety, the higher the aggregate 
population required to make complete de-urbanization optimal. A high taste for variety is 
harmful to the long run efficiency of urbanization. And a low taste for variety implies 
longer lived but smaller cities. Of course, if all goods were perfect substitutes, only local 
goods would be consumed and there would be no trade. Cities would once again be 









6. Concluding remarks 
      We showed that the special assumptions of the NEG entail a strong imported varieties 
effect, perhaps too strong. When stripped from the obscuring influence of a specific 
geography, the dispersive nature of this effect becomes clear. This strong effect causes 
optimal city sizes to decline and then crash as aggregate population grows. We called this 
process de-agglomeration because it signifies not only dispersion meaning the spreading   25 
out of economic activity over space, but it also signifies de-urbanization which means 
smaller cities and more specialized cities leading ultimately to single-factory towns.  
      The NEG’s imported varieties effect stems from the extreme taste for variety of the 
Dixit-Stiglitz type. This implies that a consumer will desire all of the goods produced in 
the economy. That is grossly unrealistic. In reality most goods are produced in many 
cities and therefore many goods produced in separate cities are viewed as perfect 
substitutes. Trade among cities is not as indispensable as the standard NEG setup 
suggests. The strong emphasis on trading costs may be explained by the fact that the 
NEG was originated by a trade theorist (Paul Krugman). However, Krugman’s 
collaboration with an urban economist (Masahisa Fujita) has not produced an appropriate 
modification of the extreme emphasis on trading costs in the NEG.  
      Our  results  also  suggest  that  the  historical  tendency  toward  increased  urban 
agglomerations despite great population growth may be explained by the fact that while 
big population increases have taken place, intercity trading and intracity commuting costs 
have fallen greatly also. Although this is an interesting argument, it may not rescue the 
NEG model. As we saw, falling intercity trading costs actually help de-agglomeration, 
contrary to what occurs in Krugman’s agriculture based core-periphery model. Can 
improvements in commuting costs alone account for the increasing urban agglomeration 
trends? Perhaps they can. But as technical progress in intraurban transportation and road-
building reach their limits, something else must drive urbanization.    
         To reverse the NEG result that de-agglomeration is inevitable, future models will 
need to emphasize other centripetal forces that can offset the dispersive forces of the 
NEG. There are several candidates. 1) Haddar and Pines (2002), in a model that 
accommodates a maximum of two locations, have shown that population will concentrate   26 
in one location if the demand for land by consumers is price and income elastic and land 
and product varieties are substitutes. It is not clear that this property survives to our case 
of an endogenously determined number of cities, but it is certainly true that the density 
adjustments in large cities mitigate the centrifugal effect of commuting cost, thus 
favoring larger cities. 2) It has been suggested that larger cities help reduce the cost of 
matching up firms and workers and improve the quality of such matches (Helsley and 
Strange (1990)). 3) Although a good theory is lacking, there is some empirical evidence 
that higher land use densities make workers more productive (Moomaw (1981), Ciccone 
and Hall (1996)). 4) Again although a good theory is lacking, there is tentative evidence 
that large cities are more diverse in industrial mix and that such diversity is associated 
with more growth (Glaeser et.al. (1992)). Any one of these ideas, and undoubtedly some 
others, could be used to strengthen the NEG’s ability to generate agglomerations that are 
sustainable under population growth. Otherwise, the implications of the NEG are that 
urbanization is the result of falling commuting cost or of the limits of geography itself 
which prevents economies from rapidly spawning new cities. 
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Proof: We need to examine corner as well as interior extremes in  . 
Since we make sure (by choosing f ) that   (the population requirement of a single 
max min N N N ≤ ≤
min N  28 
firm) is very close to zero, we will just evaluate V at N = 0. From (7′′) we can see 
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The first order condition necessary for an interior maximum in this range is: 

































.                (A.1) 
 We have V  for all    and P >0. Hence, at an interior extreme 
point, (A.1) vanishes by the bracket being zero. Cross-multiplying the expression inside 
the bracket, we obtain a second degree polynomial  , where 
0 > max min N N N ≤ ≤
0 = + + C BX 2
1
N X ≡ , 
) 3ω = A ,  ) 1 (
1
ω τ ω − 2 = B and  . )P ω + C  Applying the quadratic 
formula and simplifying the resulting expression, the two roots are: 
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P
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 .            (A.2b)                  
Note that   and  . For an interior solution to exist the N given by 
(A.2a) and (A.2b) must be real. This requires that the expression under the square root 
sign be non-negative. This amounts to requiring that aggregate population not be above a 
critical threshold. From (A.2a) or (A.2b) that threshold is  , given in the statement of the 
Proposition. 
) 0 ( = a N
        For  any  ,  with the square-root expression taken as 
nonnegative.  It is easy to verify that 
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for all P > 0 and 
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.                 (A.3b) 
Hence, the V curve has a local minimum at  and a local maximum at   
in the range   for   As P → , the curve V  shifts up as 
shown in Figure 2, and when  the local minimum and maximum have converged to 
an inflection point. (In Figure 2 follow  and the corresponding 
utility curves.) The fact that the two roots converge to the same value as P reaches  can 
be verified directly from (A.2a) and (A.2b) by evaluating these at   The square root 
expression is zero and the unique N is























































, one fourth 
of the autarkic city size. Once   the curve V  is negatively sloped throughout 







      From Figure 2, the locus of optima as P increases starts at some   and 
follows the path of the interior local maximum. During this phase 
 Then, before P reaches  , at the first instance that 
 for some   city sizes suddenly crash to the minimum 
city size forming single-firm towns and the number of settlements jumping suddenly 
from 
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. The maximized value of utility, meanwhile, makes no jumps 
through this process.  
       It  will  be  important  that  the  curveV shift up in such a way that 
shift up faster than V . That will insure that when the maximum 
switches from the interior to the corner solution at  , it will thereafter remain at the 
corner solution and not switch back to an interior maximum position again. Fortunately, 
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.               (A.4) 
The value of this derivative will decrease as N  increases as long as 1  or, 
equivalently,   If this condition does not hold, the optimum may vacillate between 
an interior and a corner position but it will eventually settle down at the corner solution as 
0 ≥ −ω
. 2 ≥ σ  30 
P →  and will remain at the corner solution for higher P since there are no interior local 
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TABLE 1:  Possible patterns for the evolution of a system of identical cities under  
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TABLE 2: The centripetal and centrifugal effects of the NEG and how they  
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city i
city j
FIGURE 1:  Trading routes in the symmetric system of cities 
                      located on the peripehry of a large circle 
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FIGURE 2:  The  de-agglomeration path of city size and welfare under 
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FIGURE 3:  The de-agglomeration path of city size with growing aggregate population 
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